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TITLE 14, NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW RULE FOR
CONTRACTUAL DISPUTES: AVOIDING THE
UNREASONABLE RESULTS
On July 19, 1984, New York Governor Mario Cuomo signed
into law Assembly Bill 7307-A,' codified primarily as title 14 of the
New York Law of General Obligations.2 The new statute modifies
New York's conflicts of law doctrine. Prior to title 14, New York
courts generally enforced contracting parties' choice of New York
law to govern an agreement only if the state maintained a reason-
able relationship with the agreement.3 In contrast, title 14 requires
New York courts to enforce such clauses in large agreements even in
the absence of a reasonable relationship between New York and the
contract.4 In addition, the new statute expands New York's in per-
sonam jurisdiction by permitting parties who stipulate New York law
to consent to New York jurisdiction. 5
This Note addresses the constitutionality of title 14 under the
full faith and credit clause. Section I presents a historical backdrop
to title 14. It first demonstrates that choice of law implicates two
competing values: recognition of the legislative policies of inter-
ested jurisdictions and the autonomy of contracting parties to
choose a particular jurisdiction's law to govern their multijurisdic-
tional agreement. 6 Second, the section discusses the constitutional
limitations imposed on states' choice of law decisions by the full
faith and credit clause. 7 The section then reviews New York's com-
mon law doctrine for solving conflict of law problems in contractual
disputes.8 Section II discusses the mechanics and legislative goals
of title 14 and highlights the significant changes that the statute im-
plements. 9 Focusing on these significant changes, section III ana-
lyzes title 14 in light of the full faith and credit clause. This analysis
demonstrates that title 14 is unconstitutional because it requires
New York courts to apply New York law to contracts bearing no sig-
nificant contact to the state, and in circumvention of other inter-
1 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 421.
2 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §§ 5-1401, 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). Part of the
session law is codified in New York civil practice law. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 327(b) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1984-85) [for convenience, the session law is hereinafter cited as title 14].
3 See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
7 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. See infra notes 24-67 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
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ested states' legislative policies. This Note concludes that New York
should amend title 14 so that the new law will conform to the con-




A. The Values Underlying State Conflict of Law Doctrines
The various approaches to conflict of law issues in interstate
and international contractual disputes reveal two competing values.
First, conflict of law rules should allow contracting parties some
freedom to select the law that will govern their agreement." Sec-
ond, conflict of law rules should recognize the various legislative
policies ofjurisdictions that are interested in a particular dispute. 12
Contracting parties' freedom to designate governing law fosters cer-
tainty, whereas the recognition of other jurisdictions' policies fur-
thers comity and discourages parties from seeking to avoid the
policies of a given state.13
Almost all modem conflicts theories place at least some weight
on the intent of the parties when deciding what law should apply to
a multijurisdictional contractual dispute. At one extreme stands the
"objectivist approach" which gives only limited weight to governing
law clauses and emphasizes the legislative policies of the competing
jurisdictions.14 This approach provides that when a contract does
not include a governing law clause, a court should look to the law of
the jurisdiction maintaining the "most substantial contacts" with the
agreement.' 5 Correspondingly, when a contract includes a gov-
erning law clause, the parties' choice of law becomes only one of
several factors that a court should consider in determining which
jurisdiction bears the "most substantial contacts.'16
At the other extreme is the autonomist position, maintaining
that courts should honor the contracting parties' choice of gov-
10 See infra notes 116-38 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 14-16, 20-23 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
14 Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy
or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1659, 1678 (1982); see also Haag v. Barnes, 9
N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961) (application of objectivist ap-
proach to conflict of law problems in contractual dispute with governing law clauses).
15 See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (1954) ("most
substantial contacts" refers to jurisdiction with greatest interest in litigation).
16 See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 559, 175 N.E.2d 441,443, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68
(1961) (intention of parties is not decisive).
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erning law. 17 The autonomists stress that upholding governing law
clauses will assure the parties that courts will interpret their agree-
ment pursuant to their intent. 18 The autonomists minimize the im-
portance of legislative policies in contractual disputes and reject the
need for a relationship between the contract and the chosen
jurisdiction.' 9
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Restatement Second)
represents an intermediate position between the objectivists and au-
tonomists. 20 The Restatement Second grants contracting parties the
freedom to stipulate a governing law but also recognizes the legisla-
tive policies of competing jurisdictions. Under this intermediate ap-
proach, a court should apply the law of the jurisdiction bearing the
"most substantial contacts" to the agreement when the agreement
does not contain a governing law clause.2 1 When the agreement
does include a governing law clause, however, a court should honor
the stipulation unless "no reasonable relationship" exists between
the contract and the chosen state or no other "reasonable basis"
exists for the stipulation.22 Notwithstanding these rules, the Restate-
ment Second does not require courts to enforce a stipulation of gov-
erning law that circumvents the public policies of a foreign
jurisdiction. When parties stipulate the forum's law in circumven-
tion of a foreign jurisdiction's public policy, a court should ignore
the contractual stipulation of.forum law and apply the law of the
foreign jurisdiction if the foreign jurisdiction has more substantial
contacts with the contract.23
B. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
The full faith and credit clause 24 of the United States Constitu-
tion requires that a forum state recognize the legislative policies of
more interested foreign states when making choice of law deci-
sions.2 5 The clause refutes the idea that each state is a completely
17 See Note, supra note 14, at 1678.
18 See id. at 1662 n.14; see also A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWs § 176 (1962) (honoring governing law clauses promotes private contracting by
assuring parties that judicial interpretation will conform to their intent).
19 EHRENZWEIG, supra note 18, at § 176.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 187, 188 (1971).
21 Id. § 188.
22 Id. § 187(2)(a).
23 Id. § 187(2)(b).
24 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, andJudicial Proceedings of every other State." Id. "Public Acts"
include state statutory law. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154-55
(1932); Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 550 (1925).
25 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); see also infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text (discussing development of for-
eign state legislative policy prong of Court's full faith and credit clause analysis).
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autonomous jurisdiction. Indeed, the clause builds national unity
upon a foundation of mutual respect among the states for one an-
other's statutory law. 26 Of course, not every circumvention of a for-
eign state's statutory law will trigger a federal concern for national
unity.27 Consequently, the full faith and credit clause allows states
considerable leeway to apply different conflict of law rules. 28 Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has interpreted the full faith and credit
clause to establish certain boundaries within which a state's conflict
of law rules must operate.
Since the mid-1930s, the Supreme Court has recognized that as
long as the forum state maintains some contact with the transaction
or occurrence, giving rise to a sufficient interest in the application of
the forum's law, policy should not require application of a foreign
state's statute.29 Thus, in most full faith and credit clause cases the
Court has investigated whether the forum state bears a sufficient in-
terest in the dispute to apply its own law. 30 For example, in Pacific
Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 31 the Court al-
lowed California to apply its worker's compensation statute to an
employment contract even though the contracting parties, a Massa-
chusetts corporation and a Massachusetts resident, formed the
agreement in Massachusetts. The contract provided for the em-
26 See R. WEINTRAUB, CONFLICT OF LAWS 408 (1971).
27 Hague, 449 U.S. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
28 See infra notes 31-67 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has not ap-
plied the full faith and credit clause to curtail significantly the choice of law decisions of
individual states. See Note, supra note 14, at 1662-63. Despite its leniency, however, the
Court does not permit a forum state to apply its own law in cases where the state pos-
sesses only minimal contact to a transaction and where a foreign state maintains a strong
interest in the application of its law.
Many scholars prefer the Court to take a more commanding role in resolving inter-
state choice of law problems. See generally Choice of Law: A Symposium, 14 U.C.D. L. REv.
839 (1981). The dissent of three justices in the Court's most recent decision on state
chdice of law decisions suggests the possibility of increased federalization in the near
future. See Hague, 449 U.S. at 332-40 (Powell, J., dissenting). Why the Court has not
vigorously exercised the full faith and credit clause to curb states' choice of law decisions
remains unclear. Some commentators suggest that the C6urt desires to wait until more
uniformity comes to conflicts law. See, e.g., Note, supra note 14, at 1663 n.21.
29 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
30 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-20 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408,
412-13 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71-74 (1954);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502-05 (1939).
Prior to the mid-1930s, the Court used a strict full faith and credit test that balanced
the interests of the competing jurisdictions to apply the law of the state with the domi-
nant interest in the litigation. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 158-59
(1932). The sufficient interest approach is an outgrowth of Alaska Packers Ass'n v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), which recognized that "[prima facie
every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted." Id.
at 547 (emphasis in original).
31 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
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ployee's temporary employment in California, where he subse-
quently suffered a job related injury. The California worker's
compenstation law permitted the employee to recover greater bene-
fits than did the Massachusetts statute.3 2 The Supreme Court up-
held the California state court's application of California law and
emphasized that application of Massachusetts law would preclude
California from enforcing its statutory protection of employees in-
jured within its boundaries. 33 California thus maintained a sufficient
interest in the dispute to warrant the application of its law.3 4
Since Pacific Employers, the Supreme Court has applied the suffi-
cient interest test to permit forum states to choose their own law in a
variety of situations. For instance, the Court upheld a Florida dis-
trict court's use of Florida law to settle a claim on an Illinois insur-
ance policy when the contract covered ambulatory personal
property, present in Florida at the time of the injury.3 5 Similarly,
the Court permitted California, the forum state, to apply its worker's
compensation law to an employment contract formed in that state,
even though the parties performed the contract in Alaska and the
job-related injury occurred in Alaska.3 6
The Court, however, has not relied exclusively on the sufficient
interest test. In other cases the Court has adopted a second ap-
proach, considering whether applying the forum state's law would
frustrate an important legislative policy of a foreign state.37 In Order
32 Id. at 498-99.
33 Id. at 501.
34 Id.
35 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964). The Court explained that "Florida
has ample contacts with the present transaction and the parties to satisfy any conceivable
requirement of full faith and credit." Id. at 183.
36 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). The
Court stated that California had an interest in protecting workers who enter into con-
tracts in its territory. Id. at 550. See also Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S.
469, 476 (1947) (District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had ju-
risdiction to hear claim over employment contract formed in D.C. but performed in
Virginia).
Compare John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). Yates
exemplifies the fact pattern that fails to establish sufficient contacts between the forum
state and the transaction to warrant application of the forum state's law. In Yates, the
Supreme Court required a Georgia state court to apply New York law to an insurance
contract for which "there was no occurrence, nothing done [in Georgia] to which the law
of Georgia could apply." Id. at 182. The facts involved an insurance contract, "applied
for, issued and delivered in New York," id. at 179, where the policy-holder lived, and
subsequently expired. Georgia's only contact to the agreement was that the policy-
holder's widow, beneficiary of the contract, lived in Georgia at the time of the ligitation.
Id. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310 (1981) (plurality opinion) (cit-
ing Yates approvingly).
37 See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (full faith and credit clause should prevent circumvention of important inter-
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of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe38 the Court required
a South Dakota state court to apply Ohio's statute of limitations to a
contract claim by a resident of South Dakota against an Ohio frater-
nal benefit society.3 9 The state court explained that Ohio's interest
in regulating the rights and duties of members of fraternal organiza-
tions chartered in Ohio outweighed any interest that South Dakota
might maintain as the place of contract formation. 40 Similarly, in
Hughes v. Fetter41 the Court required Wisconsin, the forum state, to
apply the wrongful death statute of Illinois to an administrator's ac-
tion seeking damages for a fatal auto accident that occurred in Illi-
nois.42 Illinois law recognized the administrator's claim whereas
Wisconsin law did not.43 The Supreme Court reasoned that Illinois,
the foreign state, maintained a strong interest in the rights and du-
ties created under its wrongful death statute.44 The Court con-
cluded that "the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full
Faith and Credit Clause" mandated the application of the Illinois
statute in the Wisconsin action.45
The Supreme Court's latest discussion of the full faith and
credit clause's application to public acts is Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague,46 a plurality opinion demonstrating the continuing conflict
between the sufficient forum interest and the foreign state legisla-
tive policy approaches. Justice Brennan, announcing the judgment
of the Court, focused on whether the forum state maintained a suffi-
cient interest in the application of its own statutory law.47 Justice
Stevens, concurring to form the plurality, evaluated whether appli-
cation of the forum state's law would thwart the legislative policies
ests of foreign state); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955) (dictum) (full faith and
credit clause restrains forum state's hostility to public acts of foreign states).
38 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
39 Id. at 589.
410 Id. at 616-17. "The foundation of the [fraternal] society is the law of Ohio. It
provides the unifying control over the rights and obligations of its members." Id. at 606
(citing Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 75 (1938)).
To illustrate the Wolfe Court's emphasis on the foreign state's policies, compare its
facts with those in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493 (1939), see supra text accompanying notes 31-34. The contact with the forum state is
similar in both cases. Adopting the Pacific Employers test would have led the Wolfe court
to mandate the application of forum state law. Instead, Wolfe evaluated the significance
of the foreign state's legislative policies and reached a contrary result.
41 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
42 Id. at 613.
43 Wisconsin's wrongful death statute allowed recovery only when the tort occurred
in Wisconsin. Id. at 610 & n.2.
44 Id. at 613.
45 Id. at 612-13.
46 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
47 Id. at 313-20 (plurality opinion).
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of the interested foreign state.48
The plaintiff in Hague, domiciled in Wisconsin but employed in
Minnesota, purchased automobile insurance from Allstate. On his
way home from work, Hague died in a highway accident in Wiscon-
sin. After establishing residence in Minnesota, Hague's widow sued
Allstate for compensation under the insurance contract in a Minne-
sota state court. The Minnesota court applied Minnesota law and
awarded judgment to the widow in an amount exceeding the poten-
tial recovery under Wisconsin law. 49 The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the full faith and credit clause did not
mandate the application of Wisconsin law.50
In the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan approved of Minne-
sota's application of its law because the forum state maintained "sig-
nificant contacts" to the transaction. 5' Citing previous cases which
used the sufficient interest test,52 Justice Brennan rephrased this full
faith and credit approach: "[T]his Court has traditionally examined
the contacts of the State, whose law was applied, with the parties
and with the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litiga-
tion."' 53 Absent "significant contacts" implicating an interest for the
forum state, the Court would require the application of the inter-
ested foreign state's law. 54 Justice Brennan noted that in the instant
case, Minnesota maintained three contacts with the transaction that
cumulatively provided "significant contacts" creating a state interest
that warranted the application of Minnesota law. 55 First, the dece-
dent's participation in Minnesota's work force triggered the forum
state's interest in the estate rights of Minnesota employees. 56 Sec-
ond, Allstate's presence in Minnesota gave the forum an interest in
regulating the company's contractual obligations to Minnesota em-
ployees. 57 Last, Minnesota had an interest in the protection of the
widow's well-being because of her Minnesota residence. 58
In his concurrence Justice Stevens found "it unnecessary to
evaluate the forum State's interest in the litigation. ' 59 Emphasizing
48 Id. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 305-08 (plurality opinion).
50 Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979).
51 449 U.S. at 307-20 (plurality opinion).
52 See cases cited supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
53 Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 (plurality opinion).
54 Id. ("the Court has invalidated the choice of law of a State which has no signifi-
cant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the par-
ties and the occurrence or transaction").
55 Id. at 313 (plurality opinion).
56 Id. at 314-15.
57 Id. at 317-18.
58 Id. at 318-19.
59 Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
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the full faith and credit clause policy of fostering "national unity by
[preventing a forum state from] unjustifiably infringing on the legiti-
mate interests of another State," 60 Justice Stevens found that appli-
cation of Minnesota law did not frustrate an important policy
interest of Wisconsin. 61 He noted that any conceivable concern that
Wisconsin might have about the interpretation of the contract could
not control the choice of law decision because the facts did not indi-
cate that the parties intended Wisconsin law to govern the insurance
policy. 62 Moreover, even if the parties had intended the application
of Wisconsin law, Justice Stevens indicated that this intent would
not trigger a Wisconsin legislative policy interest under the full faith
and credit clause.6 3
Although the Court has failed to articulate a single standard de-
lineating the parameters of the full faith and credit clause,64 the
cases demonstrate that the clause will not void a court's choice of
forum state law unless the forum state has no "significant contact"
to the transaction or occurrence implicating the forum's interest and
a foreign state maintains an important interest in the application of
its legislative policies to the dispute. Exclusive use of the foreign
state legislative policy test would yield unreasonable results because
the existence of an important foreign state interest does not pre-
clude the existence of an important forum state interest.65 If the
forum state maintains significant contact to the transaction or occur-
rence, comity should not require the court to apply a foreign state's
law. 66 On the other hand, a standard that examines only the degree
of the forum state's interest in the dispute may also yield unreasona-
60 Id. at 323.
61 Id. at 324.
62 Id. Justice Stevens did not address whether Wisconsin maintained, as the site of
the accident, an interest in regulating recovery for torts occurring within its territorial
boundaries.
63 Id. at 324-25 n.ll.
64 The division of opinion among the justices regarding the standard embodied in
the full faith and credit clause may be more apparent than the Hague decision indicates.
The dissenting justices stated that their "disagreement with the plurality is narrow." Id.
at 332 (Powell,J., dissenting). Justice Powell, writing for the dissent, noted that he "ac-
cept[ed] with few reservations [the overall full faith and credit standard set out in] the
plurality opinion." Id. The dissenters' disagreement with the plurality stemmed from
the exact formulation and application of the "significant contacts" standard to the Hague
facts. They would require a higher threshold of contacts than the plurality required to
warrant application of a forum state's law to the litigation. Id. at 333-36. The dissent
characterized the contacts between Minnesota and the litigation in Hague as "trivial." Id.
at 332.
65 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935) ("A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without re-
gard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, whenever conflict
arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot
be in its own.").
66 Hague, 449 U.S. at 323-24 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he fact that
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ble results. Application of forum state law will not necessarily frus-
trate the policies of a foreign state even if the forum state maintains
no significant interests in the transaction or occurrence. Therefore,
the full faith and credit clause sets up a two-pronged standard of
review: a court must examine both the forum state's interest and
the legislative policies of foreign states. 67
C. New York's Common Law Rules for Conflicts of Law in
Contract Actions
New York courts will not consider the parties' intent when de-
termining the applicable law for a multijurisdictional agreement un-
less the contract includes a governing law clause.68 If the contract
does include a governing law clause, New York courts generally will
give some consideration to the parties' intent by using tests similar
a choice-of-law decision may be unsound as a matter of conflicts law does not necessarily
implicate the federal concerns embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause.").
67 Ordinarily, the Court will not require the application of foreign state law when
the forum maintains significant contacts with the transaction. In extraordinary situa-
tions, however, where the foreign state policy is vital, the court will require its applica-
tion notwithstanding a signficant interest of the forum. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951) (rights and duties created under foreign state's wrongful death statute);
Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (contracts
for membership to fraternal organizations); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912)
(corporate bankruptcy law).
68 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160-61, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (1954) (rejecting
older rules which honored nonexplicit but discoverable intent of parties). See generally
Note, supra note 14, at 1662 (American trend is not to honor parties' intent unless ex-
plicit).
Early New York cases exhibited little uniformity in the rules used to solve choice of
law disputes over multijurisdictional agreements without governing law clauses. Some
cases applied strict territorial rules, looking to the law of the place of formation to an-
swer questions of contract formation, to the law of the place of performance to resolve
controversies about interpretation, and to the forum's law to settle disputes regarding
remedies. Union Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 65 N.E. 672 (1902). Other
cases, however, used these territorial rules only in the absence of a discernable choice by
the parties of a desired jurisdiction's substantive law. Stumpfv. Hallahan, 101 A.D. 383,
91 N.Y.S. 1062 (1906). Still other cases ignored any reference to the territorial rules for
a direct search for the implied intent of the parties. Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150
N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896).
In Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), however, the New York
Court of Appeals rejected both the rigid territorial rules and the search for the implied
intent of the parties. Instead, the court articulated a new "grouping of contacts" test,
used today to determine the applicable law for a multijurisdictional contact without a
governing law clause. See Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d
372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969); Speare v. Consolidated Assets Corp.,
367 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agree-
ments-New York's Approach, 18 CoLtJM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 327 (1979) ("AlthoughAu-
ten v. Auten is a noncommercial case, its approach has been applied to commercial
cases.") (footnote omitted).
1985] 235
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
to the Restatement Second 69 and objectivist approaches. 70 Most New
York courts will honor a contractual governing law clause if the cho-
sen jurisdiction maintains a "reasonable relationship" to the agree-
ment. 7' This approach is similar to the rule of the Restatement Second.
A few New York courts, however, use an objectivist "interest analy-
sis" test, considering the parties' stipulation of governing law as
only one of several factors leading to a determination of which juris-
diction bears the most significant contacts to the agreement.7 2 Both
of these approaches fit comfortably within the confines of the full
faith and credit clause.
In A. S. Rampell v. Hyster Co. 73 the New York Court of Appeals
adopted the reasonable relationship test previously adopted by
lower New York courts7 4 and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. 75 Rampell, a New York distributor, contracted
with Hyster, an Oregon manufacturer of trucks, cranes, and related
parts, stipulating the application of Oregon law.76 The court upheld
the stipulation because Oregon maintained a reasonable relation-
ship to the contract as the situs for the production of the goods. 77
Most New York courts have adopted the reasonable relation-
ship test. 78 Use of this rule, however, does not imply that New York
courts always honor governing law clauses. Admittedly, no New
York state court has refused to honor a contractual stipulation of
New York law to avoid circumventing a public policy of a foreign
state.79 New York courts will not honor a stipulation of a foreign
jurisdiction's law that thwarts New York public policy even if the
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187-88 (1971); see supra notes
20-29 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text (discussing contours and develop-
ment of reasonable relationship test in New York). See generally Gruson, supra note 68, at
352 ("Today the reasonable relationship test is clearly a rule of New York law.").
72 See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing Court of Appeals adop-
tion of interest analysis). See generally Note, supra note 14, at 1670-72.
73 3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957).
74 In re Rosenberger's Estate, 131 N.Y.S.2d 59, 66 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1954)
(honoring contractual stipulation of New York law for financial transaction performed
by depositing $12,000 in New York bank).
75 Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, 156 F.2d 596, 598 (2d Cir. 1946) (up-
holding contractual stipulation of New York law because New York, among many states,
had close association with contract).
76 Rampell, 3 N.Y.2d at 373-74, 144 N.E.2d at 374, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
77 Id. at 381, 144 N.E.2d at 379, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 485-86.
78 See, e.g., Gambar Enters., Inc. v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 69 A.D.2d 297, 418 N.Y.S.2d
818, 822 (1979) (stipulated jurisdiction must bear reasonable relation to agreement);
I.S. Joseph Co. v. Toufic Aris. & Fils, 54 A.D.2d 665, 666, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1976)
(same); In re Sik's Estate, 205 Misc. 715, 719, 129 N.Y.S.2d 134, 138 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County 1954) (same).
79 Gruson, supra note 68, at 377. The Federal District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, however, has disregarded governing law clauses to prevent circum-
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transaction bears a reasonable relationship to the foreign jurisdic-
tion.8 0 Furthermore, not every "contact" to the chosen jurisdiction
rises to the level of a reasonable relationship. For example, the
presence of one party's business office in the chosen state did not
constitute a reasonable relationship to that state when performance
and formation of the contract occurred elsewhere.8 ' Similarly, the
presence of one party's business office in the chosen state, and a
contractual condition requiring arbitration in the chosen state, did
not constitute a reasonable relationship between the chosen state
and the contract.8 2
On the other hand, various aspects of contract performance fre-
quently have constituted a reasonable relationship to the chosen ju-
risdiction. New York courts have upheld stipulations of New York
law when loan agreements provided for the flow of money through
New York banks.8 3 Various combinations of performance, party
domicile, and contract formation also have constituted a reasonable
relationship. For example, a New York court upheld a stipulation of
Michigan law in an employment contract, formed in Michigan and
providing for the employee's performance of certain duties in that
state.8 4
Although most New York courts use the lenient reasonable re-
lationship test, a few New York courts have applied the stricter "in-
terest analysis" test to contracts stipulating governing law. In Haag
v. Barnes8 5 the New York Court of Appeals refused to give control-
ling weight to a governing law clause stipulating the law of Illinois.
Rather, the court focused on determining which jurisdiction main-
vention of a foreign jurisdiction's public policies. See Southern Int'l Sales Co. v. Potter &
Brumfield Div. of AMF, 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
80 See, e.g., Gambar Enters., Inc. v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 69 A.D.2d 297, 303, 418
N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (1979) ("[E]nforcement of the [contract] provision applying a foreign
rule of law must not violate a fundamental public policy of New York.") (citations omit-
ted); cf. J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), 37 N.Y.2d 220, 229, 333 N.E.2d
168, 173, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 899 (principle of comity does not require application of
foreign nation law where it would violate New York public policy), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
866 (1975).
81 Joy v. Heidrich & Struggles, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 818, 822-23, 403 N.Y.S.2d 613,
615-16 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977).
82 Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, 442 F. Supp. 86, 88 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
83 E.g., J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), 37 N.Y.2d 220, 226-28, 333
N.E.2d 168, 172-74, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 898-900, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); In re
Rosenberger's Estate, 131 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1954).
84 Gambar Enters., Inc. v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 69 A.D.2d 297, 305-06, 418 N.Y.S.2d
818, 822 (1979). See Fleishman Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (partial performance of contract and defendant's presence in England
constituted "reasonable relationship" for governing law clause selecting English law).
85 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
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tained the most significant contacts to the contract.86 The court
considered the parties' stipulation of governing law a salient factor,
but it also examined where the parties formed their agreement and
where they carried out its terms and conditions.8 7 Although Haag v.
Barnes is the minority view in New York, the case still stands as good
precedent, and some lower New York courts have used its interest
analysis investigation in choice of law decisions. 88
Both the reasonable relationship and "interest analysis" tests fit
within the confines of the full faith and credit clause. The Supreme
Court will not mandate use of foreign state law when the forum pos-
sesses significant contacts to the transaction.89 Applied to a contrac-
tual stipulation of forum state law, the reasonable relationship test
requires at least these same contacts. 90 Similarly, the "interest anal-
ysis" approach requires that the forum state maintain significant
contacts to an agreement stipulating the forum state's law. Permit-
ting the application of the forum state's law only when that state
bears the "most substantial contacts" to the transaction, this test
resembles the balancing test of Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper,9' a




Title 14 alters New York's common law rules for choice of law
in certain contractual disputes. It abolishes the reasonable relation-
ship test for large commercial agreements that stipulate the applica-
tion of New York law and requires New York courts to honor the
86 Id. at 557, 175 N.E.2d at 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
87 Id.
88 See Joy v. Heidrich & Struggles, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 818, 821-23, 403 N.Y.S.2d 613,
615-16 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977); see also Levey v. Saphier, 83 Misc. 2d 146, 149, 370 N.Y.S.2d
808, 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (court applied stipulated New York law because New York
maintained most significant contacts to agreements as site of principal contracts).
89 See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
90 Compare Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 145 (1964), with Duplan Corp. v. W.B.
Davis Hosiery Mills, 442 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Duplan Corp. the presence of
one party's business office in New York and a contractual condition requiring arbitration
in New York did not constitute a reasonable relationship for New York to apply its own
law. Id. at 88 n. 1. Yet, in Clay the Supreme Court held that the mere presence of ambu-
latory property in Florida gave the forum state a sufficient interest to apply its law to an
insurance contract covering damage to the property. Clay, 377 U.S. at 182-83; see supra
note 35 and accompanying text. Arguably, the contacts held insufficient to constitute a
"reasonable relationship" in Duplan Corp. exceeded the contacts that gave rise to a suffi-
cient interest in Clay. Thus, satisfaction of the reasonable relationship test probably im-
plies satisfaction of the significant contacts test.
91 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
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parties' explicit choice of New York law. 92 Title 14 also permits par-
ties stipulating New York law to consent to New York jurisdiction
and requires New York courts to hear the action.93 In essence, title
14 is an extreme enactment of the autonomy rule94 which calls on
the courts to honor the parties' intent whenever possible.
Title 14 includes two sections: section 5-1401 and section 5-
1402. Section 5-140195 requires courts to honor contractual stipu-
lations for the application of New York law to agreements involving
$250,000 or more.96 The section excludes such "large" agreements
if they involve "personal, family, or household services" 97 or "labor
or personal services." 98 Section 5-1401 explicitly applies to large
contracts for the sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code
section 1-105(1), 99 but not to special, third party agreements under
92 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 421; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney Supp. 1984-
85). Section 5-1401 provides, in part:
The parties to any contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or
otherwise, in consideration of, or relating to any obligation arising out of
a transaction covering in the aggregate not less than two hundred fifty
thousand dollars, including a transaction otherwise covered by subsec-
tion one of section 1-105 of the uniform commercial code, may agree that
the law of this state shall govern their rights and duties in whole or in
part, whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a rea-
sonable relation to this state. This section shall not apply to any contract,
agreement or undertaking (a) for labor or personal services, (b) relating
to any transaction for personal, family or household services, or (c) to the
extent provided to the contrary in subsection two of section 1-105 of the
uniform commercial code.
Id.
93 194 N.Y. Laws ch. 421; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1402. Section 5-1402 pro-
vides, in relevant part:
1. Notwithstanding any act which limits or affects the right of a person
to maintain an action or proceeding, including, but not limited to, para-
graph (b) of section thirteen hundred fourteen of the business corpora-
tion law and subdivision two of section two hundred-b of the banking law,
any person may maintain an action or proceeding against a foreign cor-
poration, non-resident, or foreign state where the action or proceeding
arises out of or relates to any contract, agreement or understanding for
which a choice of New York law has been made in whole or in part pursu-
ant to section 5-1401 and which (a) is a contract, agreement or undertak-
ing, contingent or otherwise, in consideration of, or relating to any
obligation arising out of a transaction covering in the aggregate, not less
than one million dollars, and (b) which contains a provision or provisions
whereby such foreign corporation or non-resident agrees to submit to the
courts of this state.
1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 421; N.Y. GEN. OBIG. Lw § 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
94 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
95 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. Law § 5-1401; see supra note 92.
96 Id. § 5-1401(1).
97 Id. § 5-1401(1)(b).
98 Id. § 5-1401(I)(a).
99 Id. § 5-1401; U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1983) (allowing parties to choose governing law
where transaction bears "reasonable relation" to more than one state).
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UCC section 1-105(2).100 In sum, section 5-1401 covers large trans-
actions involving bank loans, property, or the sale of goods but does
not apply to small agreements, consumer agreements, or employ-
ment contracts.
If parties to a contract of at least $1 million stipulate New York
law under section 5-1401 they may also avail themselves of New
York courts under section 5-1402.101 Section 5-1402 allows the par-
ties to contracts stipulating New York law pursuant to section 5-
1401 to consent to New York in personamjurisdiction.10 2 When the
parties consent to jurisdiction, the statute prohibits New York courts
from dismissing the case on the grounds of inconvenient forum.103
Section 5-1402 also removes prior restrictions on the rights of for-
eign corporations and banks to sue in New York.' 0 4 A foreign cor-
poration, bank, or individual may now sue a foreign bank or
corporation in New York if both parties have stipulated New York
law pursuant to section 5-1401 and have consented to New York
jurisdiction under 5-1402.105
Title 14 reflects a legislative intent to maintain New York City's
posture as a leading financial and commercial center and thereby
benefit New York state.'0 6 Proponents of the bill recognized that
the City's preeminent status in this realm stood "by no means un-
100 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1401(1)(c); U.C.C. § 1-105(2) (1983) (prohibiting par-
ties from choosing law where code governs particular transaction).
101 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1984-855); see supra note 93.
102 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1402(1).
103 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 327(b) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). Rule 327(b) was enacted
as part of Assembly Bill 7307-A. 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 421. Rule 327(b) provides in rele-
vant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of this rule [regarding
the power of a court to dismiss an action because of inconvenient forum],
the court shall not stay or dismiss any action on the ground of inconve-
nient forum, where the action arises out of or relates to a contract, agree-
ment or undertaking to which section 5-1402 of the general obligations
law applies, and the parties in the contract have agreed that the law of
this state shall govern their rights or duties in whole or in part.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 327(b) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). Prior to enactment of the new
law, rule 327 permitted a New York court to "dismiss an action when it [found] that 'in
the interest of substantial justice' the case should be heard in another forum." Commit-
tee Report, Proposalfor Manditory Enforcement of Governing-Law Clauses and Related Clauses in
Significant Commercial Agreements, 38 REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 537, 546 (1983) (quoting rule
327).
104 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1402(1). Prior to title 14, a foreign bank, corporation,
or individual could sue another foreign bank or corporation in New York only if the
litigation involved a contract made or performed in New York, the property was situated
in New York, the cause of action arose in New York, or defendant was "doing business"
in New York. N.Y. BANKING LAw § 200-b(2) (McKinney 1973).
105 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1402(1).
106 Committee Report, supra note 103, at 548-50 (title 14 needed to attract new busi-
nesses to New York City); Letter from New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch to New
York Governor Mario M. Cuomo (July 10, 1984) (title 14 will assure contracting parties
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challenged"10 7 and recommended that the state "remain alert to
ways in which, at relatively little cost, its position [could] be en-
hanced."' 08 The proponents reasoned that parties to multijurisdic-
tional agreements frequently stipulate the law of a particular
jurisdiction to govern their contract. In New York the possibility
existed that state courts would refuse to honor the contractual stipu-
lation of New York law because the agreement lacked a reasonable
relationship to the state. 0 9 This possibility, one advocate argued,
"has frequently deterred parties from choosing the law of New York
for major contracts, to the detriment of the standing of New York as
a commercial and financial center."' 10 Thus, proponents of the bill
argued that New York should modify its conflict of law doctrine to
give parties certainty that New York courts will uphold their stipula-
tion of New York law."11
In sum, the new statute affords parties considerable autonomy
to stipulate New York law. The statutory language commands
courts to honor governing law clauses applying New York law to
agreements that come within the enumerated statutory qualifica-
tions. 112 Title 14 makes no exception for situations in which appli-
cation of New York law might circumvent an important public policy
of another jurisdiction.' 1" 3 Thus title 14 may become an instrument
for parties to apply New York law to their agreements and circum-
vent the important legislative policies of other interested states.
III
ANALYSIS
Title 14 is an extreme example of the autonomy doctrine re-
garding choice of law decisions. As such, it forwards one important
conflicts "value"-the freedom of parties to stipulate a governing
law. 114 Title 14, however, does not advance or accommodate the
of desired New York law and thereby promote commercial and financial activity in state)
[hereinafter cited as Letter].
107 Letter, supra note 106.
108 Id.
109 Committee Report, supra note 103, at 537-38.
New York courts have recognized, however, the legitimacy of protecting the status
of New York City as a financial center. SeeJ. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda),
37 N.Y.2d 220, 228, 333 N.E.2d 168, 172, 371 N.Y.S.2D 892, 898 (1975) (New York has
a "paramount interest" in protecting its status as "a financial capital of the world, serv-
ing as an international clearinghouse and market place for a plethora of international
transactions.") (citation omitted).
110 Letter, supra note 106.
111 Id.
112 Id.; Committee Report supra note 103, at 542.
113 See generally N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(a).
114 For discussion of this conflicts of law "value," see supra notes 17-23 and accom-
panying text.
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second conflicts "value"-respect for the legislative policies of
other interested jurisdictions.' 1 5 Title 14 violates the full faith and
credit clause by requiring a court to apply New York law to a con-
tractual dispute in circumvention of the policies of an interested for-
eign state when New York has no significant contact with that
agreement.
A. Title 14 Fails to Require a Sufficient Forum State Interest
The full faith and credit clause will not prohibit a forum state
from applying its law to a transaction that implicates a sufficient fo-
rum state interest.1 16 In its most recent articulation of this sufficient
interest prong of its full faith and credit clause analysis, the Court
searched for significant contact to the forum that implicated the fo-
rum's interest in the application of its own law. 117 Title 14 rests on
the central premise that a contractual stipulation of New York law
constitutes a significant contact between the agreement and the
state for the use of New York law. 118 Nevertheless, an analysis of
the interests New York proffers for the application of its law pursu-
ant to tide 14 demonstrates that these interests are not sufficient to
warrant application of New York law in all cases.
First, the proponents of title 14 argue that enforcing governing
law clauses that stipulate New York law will improve New York
City's stature as a leading financial and commercial center. 119
Under full faith and credit clause scrutiny this rationale must fail for
two reasons: the economic benefits flowing from title 14 may be illu-
sory, and even if the state does realize certain benefits, these bene-
fits do not create the level of interest in the transaction or
occurrence requisite under the full faith and credit clause. The eco-
nomic benefits may not materalize because the significant
macroeconomic fruits of large commercial transactions extend to
the jurisdictions physically connected with the transaction. Agree-
ments involving the circulation of money through a state's banks
115 For discussion of this conflicts of law "value," see supra notes 14-16, 20-23 and
accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 29-63 and accompanying text.
117 Hague, 449 U.S. at 308 ("[T]he Court has invalidated the choice of law of a State
which has no significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state inter-
ests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.") (emphasis added) (plurality
opinion); see also supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
118 Letter, supra note 106.
119 See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. Significantly, however, neither
the New York City Bar Association Report nor any other supporting document ade-
quately explains how permitting parties to stipulate New York law will result in eco-
nomic benefits for New York. The Bar Report attempts to provide an explanation, but
its discussion is not supported by any authority. See Committee Report, supra note 103,
at 549.
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benefit those in-state institutions. Agreements for the production of
goods or the construction of facilities generate employment at the
site of production, and the positive economic effect of such employ-
ment benefits that state's economy. Ironically, title 14 does nothing
to encourage increased commerce in New York state. Parties may
bestow the significant fruit of their activity in other states while
reaping the benefits of New York's well developed commercial law.
Whereas previously parties had an incentive to maintain actual con-
tact with New York, now they only need to include a governing law
clause in their agreement.
Furthermore, even if New York will reap economic benefits
from stipulations of New York law in multijurisdictional agreements,
these benefits do not appear to provide the significant contacts with
the transaction or occurrence required by the full faith and credit
clause. By stipulating New York law and submitting to New York
jurisdiction, parties may use New York lawyers for advice,, drafting,
and subsequent litigation on the contract. The parties may take
business trips to New York, adding revenue to the state's hotels,
restaurants, and stores. Thus, New York may gain a reputation as a
center for multijurisdictional contracts. These incidental benefits,
however, are economic interests that a forum jurisdiction always has
in the application of its law. Consequently, this argument in sup-
port of title 14 is hopelessly circular. A finding that these incidental
economic benefits constitute an interest sufficient to warrant appli-
cation of the forum state's law would effectively do away with the
requirement because these benefits always accompany the applica-
tion of forum state law. Thus, a forum state would always enjoy the
right to apply its law, not because it maintained an interest in the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject of dispute, but merely
because it took an interest in the application of its own law.
Second, supporters of title 14 argue that New York maintains
an interest in providing certainty to parties who stipulate that New
York doctrine will govern their agreement.1 20 As discussed previ-
ously, providing parties with certainty that courts will interpret their
contract using the state law they intend is an important conflict of
law "value."' 2 1 Nevertheless, the application of title 14 will do little
to promote certainty. Although title 14 gives contracting parties
certainty that New York courts will honor their choice of New York
law, the statute does not give parties any certainty that all courts will
apply New York law pursuant to a governing law clause. Most
American jurisdictions do not give absolute authority to governing
120 See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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law clauses. Some states apply the reasonable relationship test;' 22
other states adopt the "interest analysis" approach of Haag v.
Barnes.'23 Even if the parties consent to New York jurisdiction and
stipulate New York law in their multijurisdictional contract, each re-
mains free to bring suit in other states maintaining in personam ju-
risdiction.124 Consequently, if parties with no other New York
contacts stipulate New York law under title 14 and then bring their
action in a different state, New York law probably will not govern
the dispute. Courts applying the reasonable relationship test will
void the governing law clause on the ground that New York lacks
the requisite contact with the agreement. Similarly, courts using the
interest analysis test will ignore the governing law clause and apply
the law of a state significantly interested in the transaction.
Despite the presence of a governing law clause and consent to
New York jurisdiction pursuant to title 14, a plaintiff may take ad-
vantage of distinctions between New York substantive law and the
substantive doctrine of a foreign jurisdiction by suing in the foreign
jurisdiction and seeking recovery under its law. Consequently, even
if New York courts always honor contractual stipulations under title
14, parties to these agreements can never be certain that New York
law will govern a dispute arising out of that agreement. Therefore,
the argument that New York's interest in providing certainty to par-
ties choosing New York law is sufficient to pass muster under the
full faith and credit clause must fail.
B. Title 14 Fails to Consider the Legislative Policies
of Other States
The full faith and credit clause advances national unity by re-
quiring that a forum state recognize the legislative policies of for-
eign states.' 25 Yet, title 14 requires New York courts to apply New
122 See generally E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 634-36 (1982) ("[O]rdinarily
the chosen law must bear some relationship to the parties or the transaction, [and the
parties may not] override certain important policies of the forum or of the state whose
law would otherwise be applicable.").
123 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961);see Note, supra note 14, at
1672-73.
Courts of foreign states may become reluctant to apply New York law in conflicts
disputes because of New York's attempted "imperial reach." See, e.g, Bushkin Assocs.
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 628-36 (1985) (refusing to use any specific choice
of law rule to avoid application of New York's statute of frauds).
124 Many states may maintain in personam jurisdiction over the parties to a single
contractual dispute. Long arm statutes usually permit courts to exercise jurisdiction
over parties forming or performing contracts within that state. See, e.g., McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (finding that due process clause does
not preclude California court from exercising jurisdiction over nonresident defendant
where contract in issue had substantial connection with California).
125 See supra notes 37-45, 59-67.
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York law pursuant to the parties' choice and makes no exception for
situations where the application of New York law frustrates a foreign
state's public policy. 126 Hence, the statute will give rise to situations
in which the application of New York law will circumvent foreign
state legislative policies and violate the full faith and credit clause.
Although the Supreme Court has not delineated the particular
foreign state legislative policies that will prohibit the application of
the forum state's law, a few of the Court's early holdings provide
some guidance. A state maintains exclusive power to regulate the
rights and duties of corporations and other organizations chartered
under its law.' 27 A state also enjoys a strong interest in regulating
transactions involving property within its borders. 128 Further, a
state retains a compelling interest in the recognition and enforce-
ment of rights and duties created under its wrongful death stat-
utes. 29 On the other hand, a mere contractual stipulation of a
foreign state's law does not mandate its application in a forum
court. 13
0
Other legislative policies generally fall into the scope of the
Supreme Court precedents because they regulate a state's economy,
public safety, or legal system by making illegal or otherwise unen-
forceable certain contracts. These legislative policies are prime can-
didates for comity by a forum state. A statute of frauds, for
example, protects the integrity of a state's legal system and thus
provides a stable climate for parties to contract.' 3 ' Similarly, laws
prohibiting contractual arbitration clauses serve to protect the pro-
cedural aspects of a state's legal system.' 3 2 Further, a state may en-
act statutes prohibiting unlicensed contractors from bringing suits
on their agreements with subcontractors. 133 Such prohibitions
serve to avoid the danger of poorly constructed public buildings. 34
126 See supra notes 92-105, 113, and accompanying text.
127 Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 253 (1912); cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401 (1900) (stating that "[t]he power of a state to impose condi-
tions upon a foreign corporation [contracting in the state] is certainly as extensive as the
power over domestic corporations").
128 See, e.g., Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915) (upholding state statute of de-
scent excluding children adopted under proceedings in other states).
129 See supra notes 41-63 and accompanying text.
130 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 324-26 n.ll (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (reviewing prior cases and suggesting that expectations of par-
ties may generate full faith and credit clause interest for foreign state).
'31 SeeJoy v. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 818, 821,403 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (forum state has strong public policy interest to "prevent fraud and
perjury in the making and enforcement of contracts").
132 Note, supra note 14, at 1686 (bars on arbitration clauses direct courts to "articu-
late and enforce fair ground rules for resolving contractual disputes").
'33 MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Imperial Glass Co., 65 F.R.D. 624, 632 (D. Nev.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976).
134 See id.
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Restrictions on covenants not to compete serve a state's economic
interest by promoting free enterprise. 135 A state may enact fair
dealership laws, 136 specialized regulations governing sporting
events, 137 or strict usery clauses.' 38 Each of these statutes serves an
important public purpose subject to frustration if a forum state
failed to grant the appropriate comity to that statute.
Under title 14, parties may stipulate New York law to avoid the
restrictive legislative policies of foreign states. Moreover, when the
parties do stipulate New York law in a governing law clause, title 14
requires New York courts to honor the stipulation. Given the
"broad-brush" approach of title 14, the section will require applica-
tion of New York law when New York maintains no significant con-
tacts with the transaction and when application of New York law will
circumvent important legislative policies of foreign states. Applica-
tion of New York law in such circumstances will violate the full faith
and credit clause.
C. Suggested Amendment to Title 14
Because certain applications of title 14 will violate the full faith
and credit clause, the New York state legislature should amend the
statute to prohibit parties from stipulating New York law to circum-
vent foreign states' legislative policies when New York bears no sig-
nificant contacts to the transaction. New York courts are unlikely to
create a foreign state policy exception to save the statute. The statu-
tory language and legislative intent of title 14 specifically direct the
courts to enforce governing law clauses in all cases covered by the
statute.13 9 Further, New York state courts have no tradition of void-
ing governing law clauses specifying application of New York law to
prevent the circumvention of a foreign state's legislative policies. 140
The amendment accounting for foreign legislative acts should
presume the application of New York law unless application of an
135 Blalock v. Perfect Subscription Co., 458 F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Ala. 1978), afd per
curzam, 599 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1979); Forney Indus., Inc. v. Andre, 246 F. Supp. 333
(D.N.D. 1965).
136 E.g., Southern Int'l Sales Co. v. Potter & Brumfield, 410 F. Supp. 1339, 1341-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court applied law of Puerto Rico instead of stipulated Indiana law
under § 187 of Restatement Second because Puerto Rico had strong legislative policy in
protecting its local dealers).
137 Foreman v. George Foreman Assocs., 517 F.2d 354, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1975) (Cali-
fornia law, evincing significant public policy regarding protection of boxers, invalidated
boxing contract), aftg, 389 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
138 O'Brien v. Shearson Haydon Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 686, 586 P.2d 830,
833-34 (1978) (protecting residents from burdensome interest rates is fundamental pub-
lic policy of state), supplemented, 93 Wash. 2d 51, 605 P.2d 779 (1980).
139 See supra notes 95-105, 112, and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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interested foreign state's legislative act will affect the result of the
litigation.141 This amendment would retain the intended effect of
title 14 but would avoid the constitutional problem of the current
statutory scheme. Further, the reintroduction of foreign state inter-
ests into the analysis will not create constant full faith and credit
clause problems for New York courts because the suggested frame-
work will impose a three step burden of proof on the party seeking
to override the stipulation of New York law. First, the party ob-
jecting to the application of New York law will have to prove that no
significant contacts exist between the transaction and New York.
Second, that party will have to demonstrate that the foreign statute
will lead to a different result in the litigation. Finally, the same party
will have to show that the foreign law significantly helps the foreign
state regulate its economy, public safety, or legal system. 142
Amending title 14 to include an explicit legislative policy limita-
tion will conform the statute to the contours of the full faith and
credit clause. The suggested amendment accommodates the federal
interest implicit in the full faith and credit clause-the protection of
foreign states' public acts. The amendment does not revive the rea-
sonable relationship test. Yet, removing the reasonable relationship
test is not, by itself, a dangerous reform. 143 Conflict of law policy
does not mandate a level of contact to the chosen state because stip-
ulating the interpretative law of ajurisdiction bearing no reasonable
relationship to the contract does not necessarily harm foreign juris-
dictions. 144 The true conflict of law issue is not the level of contact
between the transaction and the forum state but the significance of
the public policy at issue to an interested foreign state. A sensible
and constitutional choice of law statute need not require a reason-
able relationship to the chosen state, but it must require direct in-
vestigation into the public policy interests advanced by the law of an
interested foreign state.
CONCLUSION
As an extreme exercise of the autonomy rule, title 14 forwards
one important conflict of law value-the freedom of parties to stipu-
141 This exception would attach to § 5-1401 and read: "Nothing in this section or in
section 5-1402 shall be construed to permit contracting parties to stipulate New York
law to circumvent the public policies of other interested states."
142 See supra notes 127-28, 131-35 and accompanying text.
143 Indeed, several commentators already have questioned the need for the reason-
able relationship test. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 18, at 469; R. WEINTRAUB, COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAw 387 (1971).
144 The Restatement Second places no restraints on a party's stipulation ofajurisdic-
tion's law to cover anything that he or she could have provided for through more precise
language in the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 186 (1969).
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late the governing law for their agreement. Yet, the statute ignores
the second conflicts value: recognition of the important legislative
policies of interested foreign jurisdictions. Although the adoption
of choice of law rules remains primarily the domain of the states, the
full faith and credit clause does provide some boundaries to prevent
forum states from applying their own law to circumvent important
legislative policies of interested foreign states. Title 14 violates the
full faith and credit clause because it requires New York courts to
apply New York law to contracts in circumvention of the legislative
policies of interested foreign states when New York maintains no
significant interest in the transaction or occurrence. Therefore, the
New York State Assembly should amend title 14 to include a legisla-
tive policy exception that requires New York courts to look beyond
New York law when a foreign state has a strong interest in the liti-
gation.
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